Larry D. Johnson*

I should first indicate the usual disclaimer that whatever I say here does
not reflect any position of the United Nations Legal Office. When I saw the
topic of this symposium, "U.S. Attitudes Towards U.N. Peacekeeping and
Maintenance," I was reminded of my roots and my background, which is the
state of Nebraska. I have a cousin who has a farm outside Lincoln, and he
is fond of saying in his Midwestern accent that the only problem with the
United Nations is that there are too many foreigners in it. I do not think he
thought of that line first, but it is true that he is not alone in thinking that.
Indeed, I want to address the same issue Professor Bilder did: we are indeed
facing a difficult time of anti-U.N. and anti-multilateralism in this country.
I will just throw a few thoughts out as to why that is and what might be
done about it.
In terms of anti-U.N. attitudes, we often forget that the United Nations
was quite a different organization in the not too distant past. If you scratch
the surface, many Americans will think the U.N. has been and continues to
be anti-U.S. because, for a long time, the U.N. was a stage for the Soviet
bloc and for Communist efforts against U.S. and Western initiatives in all
kinds of fields, such as human rights. It was also a stage where Communists
and the Group of Seventy-Seven held sway in the General Assembly and had
all kinds of resolutions passed calling for, as Americans would say, "sharing
the wealth," a new international economic order. All that gave the American
public, particularly American business, quite a fright. It was also a scene in
which anti-Israeli resolutions were constantly being adopted: one resolution
called Zionism a form of racism and others attempted to remove Israel from
the United Nations by rejecting the credentials of its representatives. It was
a place where the budget of the organization was in the hands of the nonaligned, the automatic majority, and the U.S. and the other countries that
paid 80 percent of the bills were often voting in the minority without any
way to stop it. So, in some sense, this anti-U.N. sentiment harkens back to
those days.
That is not the U.N. of today, but the message is not getting out that it is
not the same world organization at all. The Soviet Union is gone; there is no
longer any Communist bloc. There is only one superpower: the United
States. The U.S. basically gets much of what it wants out of the U.N. today.
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The Security Council is functioning more like the Charter drafters intended
it to, and the five permanent members agree more often than not. The
Council of fifteen is the engine behind the organization of 185. These
fifteen members may enact "legislation" under Chapter VII of the Charter
and the other 170 must follow. The members are required to report to
various sanctions committees as to what they are doing in their internal
legislation to abide by Security Council decisions taken under Chapter VII
of the Charter.
The U.S. has been extremely successful. It was not only able to get
authorization for the Iraq and Kuwaiti operation but has also maintained Iraqi
sanctions in spite of doubts by some as to the U.S. interpretation of the
sanctions regimes. The U.S. was also successful in getting the Security
Council to agree in the Lockerbie case that Libya's failure to turn over two
or three suspects constituted a threat to international peace and security. The
Council agreed, and therefore, sanctions were imposed on Libya. But the
fact that the U.S. was able to convince the Council without much apparent
difficulty that refusing to turn these people over constituted a threat to
international peace and security raised a few eyebrows at the time.
In addition, the U.N. is very big on advancing democratization; "fair and
free elections" is favorite boiler-plate language in the U.N., which now
supervises or verifies many elections. The U.S. Congress of the 1950s
would have been absolutely gleeful to hear that the U.N. actively takes the
side favorable to democracy as opposed to dictatorship or neutrality.
The United States and U.N. interests essentially converge today. In terms
of money, if the U.S. does not like the proposed U.N. budget, it can have it
changed, since the U.S. and the major spenders all have a de facto veto in
the budgetary process. Moreover, the senior American in the Secretariat is
an Undersecretary General in charge of administration and management, not
the Undersecretary General for General Assembly affairs or any other
diplomatic matter. He was hired a year ago from the American private
sector, from Price Waterhouse, to take charge of money and personnel.
When the U.N. diplomats hear the kinds of things my cousin has said, they
wonder what else is wanted. It is with a great deal of consternation that they
see untrue or misinformed statements in the U.S. press and the Congress.
For example, a Representative from Wisconsin has said in the famous HR
7 debate, "the American people do not want American soldiers being used
as pawns in the United Nations designs. They do not want American
soldiers under anything other than U.S. command in peacekeeping operations. The U.S. taxpayers would pay their fair share, but they do not want
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to be milked by the U.N. any longer to the tune of $1.7 billion which is then
added to voluntary support of $2.8 billion." He also said, "we all know that
these funds are simply wasted." A Congressman from California gave the
following statement: "Not one American should die serving the United
Nations. No Utopian affection for the U.N. on the other side of the
[Congressional] aisle should affect the solemn obligation of the U.S. to
protect the lives of its soldiers."
Some of these negative feelings about the U.N. come from the old U.N.,
but others come from the false information about such issues as cost, as
Professor Bilder mentioned. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher
testified in Congress that the whole foreign affairs portion of the budget
constituted one percent of the federal government budget.
Another reason for the negativity could be that the loss of U.S. lives and
the images of what occurred in Somalia are still vivid in everyone's minds.
What has not been made clear is that the operation which resulted in the loss
of American lives there was not a U.N. operation but an operation parallel
to the U.N.'s under total U.S. command.
Also, as Professor Wilner said, there is no longer an enemy. Americans
may be thinking that after World War I, the U.S. had a chance for leadership, and indeed led during the conflict, but in the end turned its back and
decided to do something else. Why do we need to get mixed up with
foreigners anyway? We do not need to fix things; we do not even need
alliances. Let's just take care of our own house for a change-America first.
Perhaps, another reason is basic U.S. politics. What U.S. politicians do
not often say is that U.N. decisions and policies are one and the same as
U.S. decisions and policies. Since the Executive branch is in the hands of
the Democrats, attacking the U.N. also attacks the foreign policies of the
Clinton administration. I am not saying there are not things to be criticized
there. For example, in terms of consistency and application of Chapter VII
decisions, the Administration is currently issuing orders that the U.S. will not
enforce the U.N. arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia. We are not
breaking the sanctions as such since we are not selling arms to the Bosnian
government, but we are no longer enforcing that embargo. On the other
hand, the reverse has been true in the case of Iraq. The U.S. has insisted on
reading the terms of the Resolution strictly in order to make sure that the
sanctions are not lifted in any way against Saddam Hussein.
There are U.N. failures which also contribute to the mood of the public.
The public, of course, does not look at Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia,
and other places where things have gone relatively well. Rather, they look
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at where there have been failures in achieving the objectives. For instance,
Somalia and Bosnia are very much on point. The Security Council adopted
various resolutions which proclaimed certain "safe areas" in Bosnia and
caused a certain expectancy that the U.N. would indeed make them safe.
However, the mandate was flawed from the very beginning. The SecretaryGeneral told the Council two or three times in writing that we could not do
this, but the Council never reacted. In August and September, when safe
areas were attacked and the U.N. did not respond, Congressmen and Senators
said "See? The U.N. is worthless. They can't do anything. We should let
N.A.T.O. take care of it, and there would be no problems." The U.S.
government and the Security Council made a mistake in adopting a mandate
which was impossible to implement without giving the Secretary-General and
the military the resources to implement it.
The dangers in the current resolutions before the House and the Senate are
threefold. First, the insistence that U.S. troops have to be under U.S.
command and not foreign command does not work in the operational sense.
What will happen if an American U.N. commander in Haiti tells a Dutch
group in a small town to take a certain measure to deal with riots and chaos,
and the Dutch commander says, "Well, I have to check with Amsterdam and
see how they feel about that," and comes back to say "Sorry, my generals
in Amsterdam feel that it would be imprudent for me to do that, so I am not
going to do it." What does that do to military discipline and military
effectiveness? Of course, Amsterdam is not Washington, but that is basically
what the U.S. is asking for in this legislation. It is interesting to note that
they exclude from the legislation the two areas in which Americans are
currently under foreign command: 500 American soldiers under Nordic
command in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Navy
Hospital in Zagreb, Croatia, which is technically under foreign command.
The Democrats questioned this in the congressional debate, but there was no
response. In the end, we may not have any Americans serving in peacekeeping operations because it just will not work the way the legislation requires.
That would be unfortunate, but it would not be the end of the world. After
all, it has only been recently that the permanent members have provided
troops for peacekeeping operations.
The second major danger in the proposed legislation is that it calls for
deductions for all U.S. support in kind or voluntarily given to U.N.
peacekeeping operations which are not part of the mandatory operations. If
the U.S. is told that the U.N. needs someone to ferry Bangladesh troops from
Bangladesh to Nairobi for service in Rwanda, and we use our logistical
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support to assist, this service which we volunteer currently free of charge
would be credited against the assessment. Everybody else would claim
similar deductions, which would involve crediting a huge sum of money.
Ruth Wedgewood reported the following in an article in the International
Herald Tribune: the British have a formal assessment of $184 million and
their unreimbursed additional cost was $741 million. Canada has a formal
assessment of $90-$100 million and their voluntary contribution was an
additional $500 million. Argentina is assessed at $4.5 million and their
unreimbursed additional contribution was $60 million. Norway, Sweden, and
others are similarly situated. The likely result would be that the U.N. would
end up with absolutely no money for its operations if such credits were
allowed.
There is also a legal point which often gets lost because its impact is not
felt as much as stopping peacekeeping: unilateral reduction of the dues is
against the Charter, which empowers the General Assembly to set the dues.
Under the current regime, the permanent members of the Security Council
pay a little more for peacekeeping because they have the veto power and
special responsibilities in the peace and security area. They are under a
different scale for peacekeeping than for the regular budget. The U.S. pays
about 30 percent. Under this legislation, the U.S. would pay 25 percent or
even 20 percent under the amended House version. Of course, we all know
that the U.S. has not been paying, but now under the Bush and Clinton
administrations, the U.S. has begun to pay its dues and to fill in the gap.
That would probably stop with this kind of legislation. Whether or not there
is a legal solution to the crisis is not certain, but it is probably not worthwhile raising the dispute to an arbitration or I.C.J. level between the U.N.
and its -host country.
Finally, as to what can be done, I agree with most of what Professor
Bilder said. The main point I would like to emphasize is that the U.S.
executive branch, or those in favor of multilateralism, should point out that
it is in the interest of the U.S. to support peacekeeping. If the Congress
continues to take its current course, it will create a tremendous vacuum
which may be filled by entities who we do not want acting in the area. For
example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where some want a lift and strike policy,
the British, French, and Canadians have essentially said, "If you do that, we
are out of here because our people will be engaged in a war in which we
will be attacked as being party to the conflict." Some countries that have
been waiting in the wings ready to come into Bosnia to replace the British
and the French are what the U.S. terms "Muslim fundamentalist states."
What sense does it make on the part of the United States to encourage that?
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The Security Council itself can improve its methods; it can watch more
carefully the drafting of its mandates and avoid the credibility problem we
have had both in Somalia and in Bosnia. It can also get out of operations
more quickly than we have before if it is quite clear that the protagonists do
not want us there. The other thing that might happen is that we may have
more contracting out, as the Secretary-General himself has said, where
organizations such as N.A.T.O. are authorized by the Security Council to
undertake some actions. Whether that is good or bad in the long run
remains to be seen.

